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1150 TERM, 1982 
459 u. s. 
No. 82-5790. BREWER v. OKLAHOMA. Ct. Crim. App. 
Okla. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 650 P. 2d 54. 
No. 82-5802. KIRK v. UNITED STATES. C. A. 4th Cir. 
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 691 F. 2d 498. 
No. 82-5805. ENGELKE v. SHERING, JUDGE OF JUSTICE 
COURT, CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA. C. A. 9th Cir. Certio-
rari denied. 
No. 82-5813. PISKACEK v. ODESSA COLLEGE ET AL. 
C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 683 F. 
2d 1371. 
No. 82-5820. CALVIN v. RYAN ET AL. C. A. 4th Cir. 
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 692 F. 2d 751. 
No. 82-5829. ANTONELLI v. ILLINOIS BELL TELEPHONE 
Co. Sup. Ct. Ill. Certiorari denied. 
No. 82-5848. PRUNTY v. DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY. 
C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 692 F. 
2d 764. 
No. 82-5871. GARZA v. MILLER, WARDEN. C. A. 7th 
Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 688 F. 2d 480. 
No. 81-1972. PORCHER, CLAIMS ADJUDICATOR, SOUTH 
CAROLINA EMPLOYMENT SECURITY COMMISSION, ET AL. v. 
BROWN ET AL. C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied. Re-
ported below: 660 F. 2d 1001. 
JUSTICE WHITE, with whom JUSTICE POWELL and JUS-
TICE REHNQUIST join, dissenting. 
Every State in the Union maintains an unemployment com-
pensation system which provides partial wage replacement 
for the unemployed. The Federal Government credits em-
ployer contributions to state unemployment programs meet-
ing certain federal requirements against the amount owing 
under the Federal Unemployment Tax Act, 26 U. S. C. 
§ 3301 et seq. One of the requirements which state plans 
ORDERS 1151 
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must meet is that "no person shall be denied [unemployment] 
compensation under . . . State law solely on the basis of 
pregnane or termination of pregnancy." 2 U. . C. 
§ 3304(a)(12). The Fou 1rcmt, in the opinion below, 660 
F. 2d 1001 (1981), held that the South Carolina Unemploy-
ment Compensation System did not meet the requirements of 
§ 3304(a)(12), and upheld a District Court order requiring the 
South Carolina Employment Security Commission (Commis-
sion) to make retroactive payments to claimants that had 
been denied compensation since January 1, 1978. In so do-
ing, the Fourth Circuit decided three issues that merit this 
Court's attention. 
The most important issue now presented for this Court's 
consideration involves the meanin of § 3304(a)(12). South 
Carolina Code § 41-35-120 (Supp. 1982) provi es that a per-
son will not be eligible for unemployment benefits "if the 
Commission finds that he has left voluntarily, without good 
cause, his most recent work... The Commission has deter-
mined that resignation due to pregnancy or to an illness un-
related to the claimant's job makes fllec laimant ineligible 
for unemployment benefits. The Fourth Circuit held that 
§ 41-35-120, as interpreted, did not satisfy the dictates of 
§ 3304(a)(12). It said: "Regardless of how the Commission 
treats employees with other disabilities, the mandate of 
[§ 3304(a)(12)] is clear: the Commission cannot deny com-
pensation 'solely on the basis of pregnancy or termination of 
pregnancy."' 660 F. 2d, at 1004. 
It is by no means clear, however, that § 3304(a)(12) -does 
not simply provide that re ancy must be treated like all 
ot er disab1 ities-t at pregnancy simp y cannot be singled 
out for unfavorable treatment. The Department of Labor 
adheres to such an interpretation, and thus disagrees with 
the Fourth Circuit's interpretation of § 3304(a)(12). The 
Department of Labor is responsible for annually determin-
ing whether state unemployment compensation programs 
meet the requirements set out in federal law. 26 U. S. C . 
., . ~ ~-·. -- =- . .:" ~ . 
-
• • • J .... 
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§ 3304(c). Moreover, the Department played a role in the 
development of the 1976 legislation that added § 3304(a)(12) 
to the Federal Unemployment Tax Act. Unemployment 
Compensation Amendments of 1976, § 312(a), 90 Stat. 2679. 
The Department of Labor has repeatedly certified that South 
Carolina's program, as well as the programs of eight other ju-
risdictions with provisions similar to that of South Carolina,* 
meet the requirements of§ 3304(a)(12). In addition, the Ad-
ministrator of the Department's Unemployment Insurance 
Service submitted, on the Department's behalf, a letter to 
the District Court reiterating the Department's position with 
respect to South Carolina's program. The Administrator ex-
plained that the South Carolina program was consistent with 
§ 3304(a)(12) because "'it does not distinguish between preg-
nant claimants or any other unemployed individuals whose 
separation is determined to be due to illness.'" Brief for 
United States as Amicus Curiae 13 (quoting Administrator's 
letter). 
At the very least then, § 3304(a)(12) is the subject of sub- ~ 
stantial uncertainty, given the clear and direct conflict be-
tween the Fourth Circuit and the Department of Labor-the 
agency to whom Congress entrusted administration of the 
statute. The conflict the Court now leaves unresolved 
makes it difficult for conscientious administrators of unem-
ployment compensation programs to determine what is re-
quired of them by the Federal Government. The position of 
the unemployment insurance administrators in the eight ju-
risdictions, in addition to South Carolina, that deny benefits 
both to those who resigned because of pregnancy and to those 
who resigned because of some non-job-related illness is 
clearly perplexing. The question presented is of obvious im-
portance to the States; South Carolina is paying additional 
benefits at a rate of almost $1.5 million per year as a result of 
*The District of Columbia, Louisiana, Missouri, Nebraska, New Mexico, 
Oklahoma, West Virginia, and, to a lesser extent, Vermont. Brief for 
United States as Amicus Curiae 18, and n. 21. 
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the decision below. See Application for Stay of Enforcement 
of Judgment 117. The question is also surely important to 
large numbers of pregnant women for whom unemployment 
compensation may constitute a substantial portion of their fi-
nancial resources. Apparently the question is one of "sub-
stantial concern" to the Department of Labor as well. Brie 
for United States as Amicus Curiae 7. \ 
The second issue of significance relates to the Eleventh 
Amendment. This Court has held that t e Eleventh 
Aiiien men prevents federal courts from enterin · udg-
ments that are to be satis e ou o tne State's eneral reve-
nues, Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U. S. 651 (1974), or out of 
state segregated tax revenues, Kennecott Copper Corp. v. 
State Tax Comm'n, 327 U. S. 573 (1946), and Great Northern 
Life Insurance Co. v. Read, 322 U. S. 47 (1944). In the de-
cision below the Fourth Circuit concluded that it could award 
a judgment against the South Carolina unemployment com-
pensation fund because: (1) the fund is "a special fund admin-
istered separate and apart from all public moneys or funds of 
the State," (2) the fund consists of employer contributions, 
federal funding, investment income, and other receipts, and 
(3) neither the State nor the Commission is liable for any ex-
cess in obligations on the fund over its resources. 660 F. 2d, 
at 1006. Reliance on these distinctions is certain! uestion-
able under th1s ou ' e Q.YS~es. The question of ) 
whether there are some state funds that do not enjoy Elev-
enth Amendment immunity is important, and this case ;a, 
presents the Court with an opportunity to address the issue. ~ A\ 
The third issue of significance is whether 42 U. S. C. § 1983 11 _;:v'?, l\ 
(1976 ed., Supp. IV) provides a cause of action to redress a :~~ 
State's failure to meet the standard set out in § 3304(a) f'' 
6 
(-I tr 
(12). In Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U. S. 1 (1980), the Court J;A~v f y( 
held that a plaintiff could sue to enforce a federal statute 
under § 1983. In Pennhurst State School and Hospital v. 
Halderman, 451 U. S. 1 (1981), we held that a plaintiff could 
not use § 1983 to enforce provisions of the Developmentally 
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Disabled Assistance and Bill of Rights Act of 1975, 42 
U. S. C. § 6001 et seq. (1976 ed. and Supp. IV). We ex-
plained that a federal statute may be enforced by a § 1983 suit 
only if Congress has not foreclosed private enforcement of 
that statute in the enactment itself and if the statute created 
enforceable "rights" under § 1983. 451 U. S., at 28. In 
Middlesex County Sewerage Authority v. National Sea 
Clammers Assn., 453 U. S. 1 (1981), we reaffirmed our hold-
ing in Pennhurst, supra, refusing to allow a § 1983 suit to en-
force provisions of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act, 
33 U. S. C. § 1251 et seq. (1976 ed. and Supp. V), and the Ma-
rine Protection, Research, and Sanctuaries Act of 1972, 33 
U. S. C. § 1401 et seq. (1976 ed. and Supp. V). Consider-
ation of the difficult and unanswered question of whether the 
Federal Unemployment Tax Act is enforceable by way of 
§ 1983 would provide guidance to the lower federal courts on 
the application of Thibotout, --Pennhurst, and Middlesex 
County Sewerage Authority. 
I would grant certiorari to consider these issues. 
No. 82-490. DAVIS v. GooDSON. Sup. Ct. Ark. Certio-
rari denied. Reported below: 276 Ark. 337, 635 S. W. 2d 
226. 
JUSTICE STEVENS, concurring. 
Because the petition for a writ of certiorari does not affirm-
atively show that a federal question was presented to or de-
cided by the Supreme Court of Arkansas, I believe the Court 
correctly denies the writ. 
JUSTICE MARSHALL, dissenting. 
Petitioner was summarily held in contempt for advising his 
client that he had a privilege not to submit to a breath-analy-
sis test. In citing petitioner for contempt, the judge made 
no finding that the advice was given in bad faith: Given the 
absence of such a finding, I would grant certiorari to decide 
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result], Rendlen [cone. in result], 
Blackmar+2 [diss.]) 
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1. SUMMARY: Petr seeks review of the Missouri Sup. Ct.'s decision 
that Missouri's policy of denying unemployment compensation benefits 
to women who leave their jobs due to pregnancy and are denied rein-
statement in those jobs does not violate 26 u.s.c. §3304(a) (12). 
T C\-t;L.c vw+ c..e~zuit -l~A<J- :r a~ 
Vhelll-LO- wrlizc ~ rec ~U-.CQ 'ctJ-,14. ct 
!Ius c c~ &,&-ej e,/LQcLh. a c c t-
2. FACTS AND HOLDING BELOW: The Federal Unemployment Tax Act con-
tains 17 "fundamental standards" that a state unemployment compensa-
tion system must meet before it may obtain the approval of the Secre-
tary of Labor in order to participate in the federal-state program for 
unemployment compensation. 26 u.s.c. §3304(a). Subsection (a) (12) 
provides that "no person shall be denied [unemployment] compensation 
••• solely on the basis of pregnancy or termination of pregnancy." 
Missouri's system has been certified by the Secretary of Labor. 
Petr was employed in Missouri by J.C. Penney's as a cashier for 
three years. In late August 1980, petr, then approximately seven 
months pregnant, requested a leave of absence, citing her pregnancy as 
the reason. In accordance with its established policy, Penney's 
granted petr a "leave" without a guarantee of reinstatement, i.e., 
petr would would be rehired only if a position was available. Petr's 
child was born on November 5, 1980. On December 1, 1980, petr noti-
fied Penney's of her desire to return to work; Penney's informed her 
that no positions were open. 
On December 7, 1980, petr filed a claim for unemployment compen-
sation benefits. A deputy for the Division of Employment Security 
denied the claim on the ground that petr was disqualified under Mo. 
Rev. Stat. §288.050.1(1) (1978), which provides that a claimant is 
disqualified if "he has left his work voluntarily without good cause 
attributable to his work or to his employer." The deputy determined 
that petr "quit because of pregnancy" rather than because of any cause 
attributable to her work or her employer. Accordingly, she was not 
eligible for benefits. This decision was affirmed by the Appeals ~ri-
bunal; the Missouri Labor and Industrial Relations Commission denied 
review. 
Petr then filed a petr for review in the Circuit Court for Jack-
son County; that court held for petr. The court accepted the agency's 
findings of fact and acknowledged that Missouri courts had construed 
§288.050.1(1) to disallow unemployment compensation benefits when the 
claimant left work on a maternity leave without a guarantee of reem-
ployment at the end of the leave period. It concluded, however, that 
the existing law in Missouri was contrary to 26 U.S.C. §3304(a) (12), 
as construed in Brown v. Porcher, 660 F.2d 1001 (CA4 1981), cert. de-
nied over three dissents, 459 u.s. 1150 (1983). Missouri Court of 
Appeals affirmed. 
The Missouri Sup. Ct. reversed in a fragmented 4-3 decision. 
Judge Welliver, joined by Judge Higgins, noted that the federal stat-
~ ute forbid denial of benefits "solely on the basis of pregnancy." 
--
The Missouri scheme does not make express reference to pregnancy; 
rather, benefits are denied only where claimants left work for reasons 
that were not attributable to the employer or connected with work. 
Also, the Department of Labor has concluded that schemes such as Mis-
souri's are consistent with §3304(a) (12). This is an appropriate case 
to defer to the interpretation of a statute by the agency entrusted 
with the administration of the statute. Finally, an examination of 
the legislative history reveals that Congress deleted language from an 
earlier draft of §3304(a) (12) that would have expressly required the 
invalidation of the Missouri scheme. "Few principles of statutory 
construction are more compelling than the proposition that Congress 
does not intend sub silentio to enact statutory language that it has 
earlier discarded in favor of other language." Nachman Corp. v. Pen-
sion benefit Guaranty Corp., 446 u.s. 359, , 392-393 (Stewart, J., dis-
senting). While there might be sound policy reasons for granting un-
employment compensation to women who leave work on account of pregnan-
cy, that decision is for Congress or the General Assembly of Missouri. 
Judge Rendlen concurred in the result. Judge Donnelly concurred in 
the result, writing separately to note his view that the United State 
Supreme Court's interpretation of the Constitution is not part of the 
supreme law of the land under Article IV!? Judge Blackmar, joined by 
Judges Billings and Gunn, dissented. They noted that the Supreme 
Court denied certiorari in Brown v. Porcher, giving some indication 
that the Court believed that the CA4's conclusion was correct. More-
over, the word "solely" means "to the exclusion of all else." As used 
in §3304(a) (12), it means that pregnancy cannot be used as a factor in 
determining an unemployment compensation award. After denial of a 
petition for rehearing, petr filed a timely petition for certiorari in 
this Court. 
3. CONTENTIONS: Petr contends that the decision of the Missouri 
Sup. Ct. directly conflicts with the CA4's decision in Brown v. 
Porcher, 660 F.2d 1001, 1004 (CA4 1981). Resolution of this conflict 
is crucial to the orderly administration of the federal unemployment 
compensation program. This issue is so significant that even before 
the emergence of a conflict, three Justices of this Court -- Justice 
White, joined by Justices Powell and Rehnquist -- believed that cer-
tiorari should have been granted to resolve this issue. Porcher v. 
Brown, 459 u.s. 1150 (1983). 
Petr also argues that the decision below promotes confusion among 
the states regarding the proper interpretation of 26 u.s.c. 
§3304(a) (12). Three states in addition to Missouri (Vermont, Minneso-
ta, and North Dakota) and the District of Columbia currently follow 
policies of denying benefits to claimant who left work because or 
pregnancy or health problems not related to employment conditions. 
The other forty-six states currently award benefits to women who leave 
work due to pregnancy and who are unable to reclaim their jobs after 
giving birth. It is therefore evident that confusion exists over the 
proper interpretation of 26 U.S.C. §3304 (a) (12). 
Finally, this issue is of critical importance to the approximate-
ly twenty-one million women between the ages of eighteen and thirty-
four in the civilian labor force in the United States. During their 
working lives, approximately eighty-five percent of women in this age 
~ group are likely to give birth at least once. The provision of a 
source of income is critical for women who wish to return to work and 
are faced with the unavailability of their previous employment. 
4. DISCUSSION: To assess the certworthiness of this petition, it 
may be useful to briefly recount the factors bearing on this Court's 
decision to deny cert in Porcher v. Brown. The pool memo in Porcher 
suggested that the CA4's reading of §3304(a) (12) was possibly incor-
rect and recommended a CVSG followed by a grant in light of the fact 
that the interpretation was contrary to that of the Department of 
Labor, the agency charged with administering the federal unemployment 
program. This Court called for the views of the SG. Thereafter, the 
SG filed an amicus brief arguing that the CA4's decision was wrong in 
light of the word "solely" in the statute and of the legislative his-
tory. However, the SG also suggested that review by this Court was 
premature. The CA4's decision might be read narrowly. Also, only 
~ -
eight states and the District of Columbia followed policies that might 
be affected by the CA4's reading of §3304(a) (12). The other forty-two 
their jobs because of preg-
nancy and would presumably continue to do so regardless of how the 
Court construed §3304(a) (12). Finally, the CA4's decision might be 
inconsequential in view of the le~ the Civ-
il Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §2000e(k). That amendment requires 
employers to treat women affected by pregnancy "the same for all em-
ployment-related purposes, including receipt of benefits under fringe 
benefit programs, as other persons not so affected but similar in 
their ability or inability to work." The 1978 amendment could operate 
to reduce the number of voluntary quits due to pregnancy ~
employers to extend more liberal maternity leave benefits to women who 
plan to return to work. The SG noted that Porcher was apparently the 
only federal case that had been filed raising the issue. In view of 
these considerations and the nonexistence of a Circuit split, the SG 
suggested that any review was "premature." 
Six justices agreed with the conclusion of the SG and voted to 
deny cert. Justice White dissented, joined by Justices Powell and 
Rehnquist. Justice White . noted that it "was by no means clear 
that §3304(a) (12) does not simply provide that pregnancy must be 
treated like all other disabilities •••• " Porcher, supra, 459 u.s., 
at 1150. The Department of Labor adheres to such an interpretation 
and thus disagrees with the CA4. This conflict "the Court now leaves 
unresolved makes it difficult for conscientious administrators of un-
employment compensation programs to determine what is required of them 
by the Federal Government." Id. , at 115 2. , This issue is of subs tan-
tial importance to the states and to women leaving their jobs due to 
pregnancy. Two other issues -- whether the CA4 could order payment of 
unemployment funds consistent with Eleventh Amendment and whether 
§1983 provides a cause of action to redress a state's failure to com-
ply with §3304(a) (12) --were also presented by the petition. Justice 
White viewed these three issues as certworthy. 
The petition here appears less certworthy than that in Porcher. 
In contrast to the CA4's opinion in Porcher, the Missouri Sup. Ct.'s 
~
decision robably correctly interpreted the statu , e (although the 
Also, while in 1983 nine jurisdic-
pol1c1es t at could have been affected by a Court deci-----.... 
sion on §3304(a) (12), today only four ad the District of Co-
lumbia could be affected. he clear trend against such 
_____...,. 
policies, it is certainly possible that these remaining jurisdictions 
may all change their policies on their own, thus completely obviating 
the need for a definitive interpretation of the statute by this Court. 
Finally, the SG may have been correct in suggesting that the 1978 
amendments to Title VII may largely reduce the need for women to quit 
their jobs due to pregnancy. For whatever reason, there are only two 
reported state or federal cases raising the question of the proper 
interpretation of §3304(a) (12): this case and Porcher. Thus, the 
issue does not appear to be generating much litigation. On balance, 
while there is now a clear split of authority on the interpretation of 
§3304 (a) (12), I believe denial is appropriate. 
If the Court is inclined to grant, a CVSG first would probably be 
appropriate since the Department of Labor's administration of the 
statute would be at issue. 
A response was called for by Justice Brennan on September 6 and 
has not yet been received. 
I recommend denial. 
September 10, 1985 Cassell Ops in petn 
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October 31, 1985 
To: Mr. Justice Powell 
From: Anne 
Re: No. 85-129, Wimberly v. Labor and Industrial Commission 
of Missouri, et al. 
A response has been filed in this case. Resp acknowledges ________..., 
that the decision of Mo. Sup. Ct. conflicts with Brown v. --------. 
Porcher, 660 F.2d 1001 (CA4 1981), cert. denied, 459 u.s. 1150 
(1983) (White, Powell, Rehnquist, J.J., dissenting from denial of 




The language of 26 u.s.c. § 3304(a) (12) states that 
- ·--- -··------- ~ 
shall be denied unemployment compensation "solely on 
~­
(5;:A 
the basis of pregnancy." The word "solely" means that Congress 
intended to prohibit States from singling out pregnant women for 
unfavorable treatment. Petr was disqualified not because she was 
pregnant but because she left her job for reasons unrelated to 
employment. The Missouri scheme denies compensation to~ 
claimants who have left work for a cause not attributable to 
their employment or employer. 
~- _-_-_ 
(2) Legislative history of section 3304 (a) (12) supports 
Mo. Sup. ct.'s construction. It states that, "Pregnant 
----1' 
individuals would, however, continue to be required to meet 
generally applicable criteria of availability to work and ability 
to work." Moreover, Congress rejected 'language that would have 
mandated the approach adopted by CA4 in Porcher. 
(3) Mo. Sup. Ct.'s decision is consistent with Department 
,.______ 
of Labor interpretation of the statute. DOL's understanding is 
-·------- __... thrtsection 3304(a) (12) "requires that the entitlement to 
benefit of pregnant claimants be determined on the same basis and 
under the same provisions applicable to all other claimants • 
• It requires only that a pregnant claimant not be treated 
differently under the law from any other unemployed individual 
and that benefits be paid or denied not on the basis of pregnancy 
but on the basis of whether she meets the statute's conditions 
for receipt of benefits." 
(4) Finally, petr's arguments amount to a contention that 
/ the state should treat other claimants less advantageously than 
it treats pregnant women. This discrimination would violate 
equal protection. 
In my view, resp's arguments are, on their face, 
reasonable. I continue to believe that the proper construction 
of section 3304(a) (12) may be left for now to further development 
in the federal CAs. 
~-----
C O'Urt .. ~~ : . ~ ':1 P. • .. ~-~ : .. 
Argued .................. . , 19 .. . 
Submitted ................ , 19 . . . 
LABOR AND 
l;.'oted on .................. , 19 .. . 
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D N POST DI S AFF REV AFF G D 
Brennan, J ................... . 
White, J ..................... . 
Marshall, J. . . . . . . . . . . . . . ... . 
Blackmun, J ................. . 
Powell, J .................... . 
Rehnquist, J ................. . ···························· '-
Stevens, J ........................... . 
O'Connor, J .......................... . 
arne 04/17/86 
April 17, 1986 
To: Mr. Justice Powell 
From: Anne 
Re: No. 85-129, Wimberly v. Labor & Industrial 
Relations Comm'n 
In response to a request from the Court, the SG has filed 
a memorandum setting forth his views on this cert. petition. The 
petition raises the question of the appropriate interpretation of 
26 u.s.c. §3304 (a) (12), which provides that "no person shall be 
denied [unemployment] compensation • • solely on the basis of 
pregnancy or termination of pregnancy." As noted in the cert. 
pool memo, Mo. Sup. Ct. held that a State does not violate 
---- '-T 
§3304(a) (12) when it denies benefits to a woman who quit because 
----------------- ~ 
of pregnancy when it denies benefits to all claimants who leave 
their jobs. The decision of Mo. Sup. Ct. with a deci-
sion of CA4, Brown v. Porcher, in which this Court declined to 
grant cert. (You and Justice Rehnquist joined Justice White's 
opinion, dissenting from denial of cert.). 
The SG's view is that the decision of Mo. Sup. Ct. is cor-
------
rect and that this Court need not undertake to resolve the con-
flict now because most States do not disqualify claimants from ...... 
---
page 2. 
ity. Thus, the issue is unlikely to be a recurring one. Petr 
has filed a reply to the SG's memorandum in which she argues that 
the question is important and that the confli~ does warrant re-
view. In petr's opinion, the fact that most states do not deny 
benefits on the basis of disability does not undercut the impor-- ..... 
tance of the conflict; if the erroneous decision of the lower 'I 
court is allowed to stand, States will be free to change their 
./ 
policy and start denying benefits in violation of §3304 (a) (12). 
While the question of whether this is a grant is close, I 
still tend to think that the issue can be left to the lower 
courts for now. In the event~hat States do start changing their ------policy of allowing benefits, the issue probably will arise with 
some frequency, and the Court can consider it then. 
Court ................... . "Voted on .................. , 1~pri1 18, 1986 
Argued ................... , 19 .. . 
Submitted ................ , 19 . . . 
Assigned .................. , 19 . . . 
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ABSENT NOT VOTING 
September 23, 1986 
WIMB GINA-POW 
85-129 Wimberly v. Labor and Industrial Relations 
Commission of Missouri 
(Supreme Court) 
MEMO TO FILE: 
This is a case of diminishing importance, but it was 
granted 7-2 to resolve a conflict with CA4. There is a 
satisfactory cert memo that I remember particularly 
because Ann Coughlin gave a lot of thought to this case, 
and two of her memos are attached to the cert memo. It ----
was her view that we should deny the case primarily 
because of the diminishing importance of the question. It 
also would be helpful to include in the file on this case 
a copy of Justice White's dissent from the denial of cert 
in Brown v. Porcher (CA4 1981), cert denied 459 U.S. 1150 
(1983), in which WHR and I joined. 
Section 26 U.S.C. 3304 (a) (12), of the Federal 
Unemployment 
- ) 
Compensation -Tax Act, provides 
~ 
that "no 
person shall be denied compensation solely on the ...._____ 
basis of pregnancy or termination of pregnancy". 
Section 288.050. (1) (1) of Missouri's Unemployment 
Compensation Statute disqualifies a claimant for insurance 
2. 
benefits who "has left his work voluntarily without good - - ---
c~~:_ibutable t~ . hi ~ . work 3 r t ? his employer." The 
Missouri courts have construed this language consistently 
to disqualify a claimant who has left his or her former 
job for a reason that is not causally connectecl to the 
work or the employer. This rule is followed even when a 
claimant leaves work because of illness or accident unless - ____...._....,_ 
the absence was caused by or aggravated by the work itself 
or by conduct of the employer. 
This case presents the pregnancy question. 
Petitioner had worked for J.C. Penny for three years 
before becoming pregnant in August 1980. She requested a 
leave of absence after seven months of pregnancy had 
elapsed. This leave was granted without any guarantee of 
reinstatement or rehiring. The child was born November 5, 
and on December 1, 1980 petitioner expressed her desire to 
return to work. She was informed that no positions were 
open. Her subsequent claim for unemployment compensation 
benefits was denied on the ground that she had "quit" her 
job solely because of the pregnancy, and not for any cause 
attributable to her work or her employer. The Missouri TC 
(a circuit court) held that petitioner was entitled to 
receive unemployment benefits, concluding that Missouri 
3. 
law was inconsistent with Section 3304(a) (12) as construed 
in Brown v. Porcher (CA4). The Missouri Court of Appeal 
affirmed the circuit court's decision, but the Missouri 
Supreme Court reversed in fragmented 4-3 dec is ions. It 
deferred to the Department of Labor's interpretation of 
the Federal statute, namely, that claimants who leave work 
because of pregnancy may be treated like all other 
claimants who leave work for reasons not attributable to 
their employment. 
Both parties rely on the "plain language" of 
§3304 (a) (12). Petitioner, as would be expected, relies 
strongly on Brown v. Porcher that found that Congress, by 
enacting this section, imposed a "sweeping ban" on 
pregnancy-related disqualifications of otherwise eligible 
women." Petitioner also disputes the statements both of 
-----------------------------
the SG and the AG of Missouri with respect to the position -
of the Department of Labor. Petitioner's brief states: 
"The Department of Labor has consistently 
supported the provision of benefits to 
unemployed pregnant women ana formerly pregnant 
women so long as they are able to work ana 
available for work." 
I note in passing that the foregoing does not 
necessarily identify the view of the Department of Labor 
4. 
with respect to the few states like Missouri that deny 
benefits to all persons who leave their jobs unless they 
leave for reasons directly attributable to the work or to 
something the employer has done or failed to do. 
The~that §3304(a) (12) -permits a state to 
have a "neutral" rule that denies benefits to employees 
who leave work because of pregnancy, illness, or accident 
or any other cause unrelated to their work or to their 
employer. The SG flatly states that the Department of 
Labor has "consistently interpreted this section to 
prohibit only state rules that single out pregnancy for 
disadvantageous treatment, and has never interpreted it to 
prohibit states like Missouri from treating pregnant women 
the same as other claimants. 
As noted above, the case now appears to be of limited 
importance. According to the cert memo, today only 4 
states and the District of CoJ umbia follow the rule of 
strict construction upheld by the Missouri Supreme Court. 
All other states have elected - without regard to the 
specific language of 3304(a) (12) -to treat pregnancy as a 
special case, and to reemploy pregnant women when a job is 
available. If we must decide the case, I am {r;ot at rest.) 
My sympathies are certainly with the petitioner, and if 
5. 
there is a principled way to reverse I would be happy to 
do so. I must say, however, that I find the SG's 
reasoning as well as that of the Missouri AG 
persuasive. This, I believe, was the view of the author 
....e. • 
of the cert memo last Term, as well as of Ann Coughlin. 
After all, the Missouri interpretation is a wholly neutral 
one. One answer that petitioner gives to the "neutrality" 
-~--------, 
argument is that pregnancy cannot fairly be compared with --
illness, injury from accident, or some other special 
-~ 
cause. It is a biological fact of ongoing life on this 
planet, and therefore is unique. 
I would like a memo from my law clerk. This can be 
fairly brief. I have not considered the relevancy of the 
Amendment to Title VII, mentioned in the briefs. 
LFP, JR. 
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This case involves the interpretation of a federal 
statute that protects pregnant women who apply for 
unemployment benefits. The question presented is whether 
the Federal Unemployment Tax Act requires states to provide 
' 
these benefits to otherwise eligible women who left their 
jobs because of pregnancy. 
I. BACKGROUND 
Petitioner Linda Wimberly used to work as a cashier in 
a Missouri department store. In 1980, when she was 7 months 
pregnant, she was given an unpaid maternity leave of 
absence. Under the employer's leave policy, Wimberly was 
not guaranteed a job when she was ready to return~ she only 
would be reinstated if there was a position available. 
Petitioner left her job, and then 1 month after the child 
was born told her employer that she wanted to return to 
work. Wimberly was told, however, that there were no 
openings. 
filed a claim for unemployment compensation with 
the Missouri Division of Employment Security (co-resp), but 
her claim was denied. Under a state statute ("§288"), a 
claimant is disqualified from receiving unemployment 
benefits if it is shown: 
That [claimant] has left his work voluntarily 
without good cause attributable xo h~k OL. to 
his employer. Mo. Rev.--Stat. §288.050.1(1) 
The state courts have construed this provision to mean that 
the claimant is disqualified if she leaves the job for any ---
medical reason, including pregnancy, that is not caused or 
aggravated by the employer or by the work itself. See Resp 
Brief at 4 nn. 8, 9 (citing cases). Resp concluded that 
Wimberly had "quit because of her pregnancy," and that since 
this condition was not attributable to her employment, 
benefits should be denied. 
Wimberly appealed, and a Mo. circuit court reversed the 
agency decision. The court found that the state's 
interpretation of §288 was inconsistent with the Federal 
Unemployment Tax Act, which regulates the operation of the 
state unemployment system. Under the Act, the Secretary of 
the Department of Labor must approve the state laws 
governing unemployment compensation. The Secretary shall 
not approve a compensation ~ystem, however, unless the state 
meets certain "fundamental standards;" one of these 
standards ("§3304") provides that 
No person shall be denied [unemployment] 1 
compensation under such State law ''solely'- on the ) 
basis of pregnancy or termination of pregnancy. 
26 u.s.c. S3304Ca) (12} (emphasis added}. 
The Mo. court noted that §3304 had been construed by thv n a case 
/ Brown v. Porcher, 
disqualified from 
nearly identical to the one at bar. 
the CA4 ruled that a woman could not be 
receiving compensation if the "sole" 
reason for her unemployment was her pregnancy. 660 F.--20 
1001 (1981), cert denied, 459 u.s. 1150 (1983}. The Mo. 
court adopted the agency's finding of fact that the only 
reason Wimberly had left her job was her pregnancy. 
Accordingly, the state court held that her disqualification 
from receiving compensation · was contrary to federal law. 
Resp appealed, but the Mo. Ct. App. affirmed. Although it 
expressed doubts about the soundness of Brown, the court 
felt bound by the CA4's interpretation of federal law. 
The Mo. s. Ct. reversed. The Court found the 
~----___...., 
interpretation of §3304 set forth in Brown unpersuasive for 
three reasons. First, the court said that the word~ 
simply indicated that Congress meant to prohibit state laws 
------ ~------------------------------that disqualified only those applicants who were pregnant. ___......., 
/.1.../~. 
The court found that the Mo. statute did not have that ~ 
effect, since it did not single out pregnancy as the basis  
for disqualification. Cert Petn- at AlO. The Mo. statute as ~ ~ 
interpreted, said the court, applied without distinction to
those workers who left their jobs for reasons unrelated to 
the employment. The court noted that this interpretation 
was shared by 3 members of this Court, who in a dissent from 
however, that §3304(a} (12} does not simply provide that 
pregnancy must be treated like all pther disabilities --
that pregnancy simply cannot be singled out for unfavorable 
-treatment." 459 u.s. 1150, 1151 (1983} (Justice White for 
LFPjr. and Justice Rehnquist}.l 
Second, the E§"ative histo~showed that §3304 was 
not as broad as Brown had held, said the state court. The 
1 There were two other issues raised in the Brown v. Porcher 
cert petn: whether the 11th amendment barred a federal remedy, 
and whether there was a §1983 cause of action available under the 
Act. My guess is that you joined the dissent from denial of cert 
because you thought the Court should address one of these other 
issues. 
original draft of the statute included language that would 
have prevented states from making benefit determinations 
that would discriminate against pregnant claimants. 2 This 
language was deleted before final passage, and the court 
interpreted this omission as a conscious choice by Congress 
not to impose a sweeping ban on all disqualifications that 
somehow were related to pregnancy. 
Finally, the court noted that Brown was inconsistent 
with the Department of Labor's interpretation of the 
statute. The Secretary has construed §3304 to mean simply 
that states cannot single out pregnant employees for special 
treatment, and could not otherwise treat these claimants 
differently from other claimants. See Cert Petn A9 n. 4. 
The court felt that under Chevron v. Natural Resources 
Defense Counsel, 467 u.s. 837 (1984}, it should defer to the 
Secretary's interpretation of the statute that he was 
entrusted to administer. 
II. DISCUSSION 
The Court's task in this case is straightforward. It 
must decide whether the Missouri statute that disqualifies 
2 The draft version of §3304(a) (12) provided: "No person shall 
be denied compensation solely on the basis of pregnancy, and 
determinations under any provision of such State law relating to 
voluntary termination of employment, availability of work, or 
refusal to accept work shall not be made in a manner which 
discriminates on the basis of pregnancy." Cert Petn at All. The 
underscored portion was deleted from final version of the bill. 
pregnant employees is consistent with the federal 
prohibition against disqualifying women just because they 
are pregnant. The parties look to 3 sources of authority 
v 
for their interpretation of §3304: (1) the language; (2) the 
./ \V" 
legislative history; (3) the Secretary's interpretation. In 
addition, each side argues that~olicy considerations compel 
a particular reading of the statute. 
A. Statutory Interpretation. 
1. Language. The dispute centers on the phrase in 
§3304 which says that a woman may not be disqualified 
"solely on the basis of pregnancy." Petitioner argues that 
her case fits the literal wording of the statute: the only 
reason she left her job was because she was pregnant, and 
the only reason she was unemployed was that her leaving was 
considered a termination of employment. Since Wimberly met 
all other conditions for receiving unemployment compensation 
(e.g., she was willing and able to work), she plausibly 
argues that her pregnancy was the "sole" reason for her 
disqualification. 
Wimberly claims that the Mo. S. Ct. interpretation of 
the phrase effectively turns §3304 into an anti-
discrimination statute: as long as pregnant claimants were 
treated the same as other employees who left their jobs for 
medical reasons, the disqualification was proper. But this 
reading is erroneous, says petr, because there is no 
evidence that Congress intended §3304 to be a discrimination 
law. The word "discrimination" is not mentioned, even 
though Congress obviously knows how to draft statutes that 
' 
protect pregnant workers against unequal treatment. See 42 
U.S. C. S 2000e C k) (Pregnancy Discrimination Act) • Wimberly 
asserts that here the language of §3304 broadly prohibits 
all disqualifications that somehow are based on the 
claimant's pregnancy. 
R:_sp and the § (amicus curiae) , on the other hand, .:::r &-
assert that the focus of §3304 is on the E£ite's reasoj for ? 
disqualifying a claimant, ~~the ~~ s~ for leaving 
her job. Resp argues that the plain language shows that 
Congress meant to invalidate laws whose sole objective is to 
disadvantage only those claimants who are pregnant, i.e., 
that single out pregnancy for disadvantageous treatment. 
Therefore if the only reason for disqualifying Wimberly was 
that she was pregnant, says resp, the state violated the 
federal provision. In this case, however, petr was denied 
benefits because she left her position for reasons not 
----~--------~---------------------------
attributable to the job or the employer. Thus the denial of -----benefits was not "solely" because of petr's pregnancy; the -------
denial was based on Mi'ss.o~.ri' s decision that people who 
voluntarily leave their job, for whatever reason, should not 
receive compensation. 
Resp argues that this interpretation of "solely" is 
supported by precedent. In Southeastern Community College 
v. Davis, 442 U.S. 397, the Court interpreted a section of 
the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, which said that a person may 
not be discriminated against "solely by reason of his 
handicap." The Court construed this provision to mean that 
discrimination was prohibited if the only reason for 
treating a person differently was that he is impaired. This 
provision did not, said the Court, require employers and 
others to give preferential treatment to the handicapped. 
Resp argues that in this case Wimberly is seeking such 
preferential treatment: even though she left her job for 
~rsonal reasons, she is asking for better treatment than 
similarly situated, non-pregnant claimants. See SG Brief at 
13-14. Resp thus believes that the claim now before the 
Court already has been rejected in Davis. See also Monroe 
v. Standard Oil, 452 u.s. 549 (19&,_1) (similar language in 
Vietnam Veterans bill). 
I think that the "plain" language of §3304 is ambiguous 
at best. Each party has presented a perfectly plausible ~~ 
reading of the statute, and each has made good arguments as 
to why the other's posit ion is f !awed. I therefore do not 
think it worthwhile to spend much time debating which is the 
more reasonable interpretation. Thus the next step is to 
examine the legislative history, to see if it sheds light on 
2. Wimberly cites two pieces of 
her po s i t ion . Her first 
argument concerns the language of the original version of 
the §3304 (quoted at n. 2 supra). Petr notes that when the 
bill was introduced, it stated that disqualifications should 
not be made "in a manner that discriminates on the basis of 
pregnancy." See Petr Brief at 19 (emphasis added). 
Wimberly agrees that under this version, resp's position 
would be correct; as long as pregnant claimants were not 
treated differently than other claimants with medical 
conditions, §3304 would be satisfied. But, Wimberly argues, 
the discrimination language was deleted from the final 
version of the bill, showing a Congressional intent to 
broaden the scope of the statute to prohibit all pregnancy-
related disqualifications. 
P~ (~) argument is that at the time 
it passeal §3304, Con~ ware that some states 
disqualified women A 
Congressional Report ("the Report") stated that there were 
two types of state statutes that adversely affected pregnant 
claimants: ( 1) those that established presumptions that a 
woman could not work for a fixed number of weeks before and 
after birth; (2) those (like Missouri) that disqualified a 
woman who left work because of her pregnancy. Wimberly 
reasons that since Congress was aware of both types of 
statutes, it was unlikely that it intended to bar the first 
type of unfairness but not the second. To the contrary, the 
clear Congressional message was that those workers who were 
willing and able to work are entitled to compensation, 
regardless of whether they were (or had been) pregnant. 
Id., at 24-25 (citing s. Rep. 94-1265 (1976)). 
~respond that Wimberly has misconstrued 
the Report. That Report listed 19 states (but not Missouri) 
that had laws disqualifying pregnant women. Resp agrees 
that §3304 was meant to invalidate those laws, but claims 
that the Missouri law is distinguishable. Each of the 19 
states, says resp, specifically singled out pregnant 
claimants for unfavorable treatment. It is true that some 
of the laws contained special disqualifications for women 
(like Wimberly) who left work because of pregnancy, but resp 
claims that in each of these states there was no similar 
disqualification for claimants who left their job for other 
nedical reasons. Resp thus asserts that Congress did not 
consider and was not concerned about a state law that 
disqualified applicants who were unemployed for any non-job 
related reason. Cf. Petr Reply Brief at 11-12 (citing two 
statutes that treated pregnancy and illness the same for 
other purposes). The Report arguably demonstrates that 
Congress was concerned specifically about eliminating laws 
that singled out pregnant claimants. SG Br~ef at 16-17. 
The SG also__./claims that the rest of the legislative 
~
He cites several 
statements made during the Congressional debates that show I 
that §3304 was designed to ensure that pregnant women were 
treated the same as other workers, not better. Id., at 18, 
21. Since the Mo. statute disqualifies all claimants who 
become unemployed for reasons not attributable to their 
jobs, the SG claims that Wimberly may not seek better 
treatment on the basis of her pregnancy. Moreover, the SG 
says that the Mo. system is consistent with the Pregnancy 
Discrimination Act, which in part amended Title VII. The 
Act states that "women affected by pregnancy shall be 
treated the same for all employment-related purposes ••• as 
other persons not so affected but similar in their ability 
or inability to work." 42 u.s.c. §2000e(k); SG Brief at 21 
n. 23. The SG asserts that this is further evidence that 
Congress only wanted to ensure that pregnant claimants 
receive the same treatment as others. 
As with the "plain language," I think the legislative ~1· )~ 
history of §3304 is inconclusive, with perhaps a slight -csvtssz£ d.. 
advantage for resp's view. While I agree that Congress ~
probably wanted to eliminate both types of disqualification 
statutes that it considered, it does not appear that the 
legislators considered any law analogous to the one 
maintained in Missouri. The SG also makes a legitimate 
point that petr's interpretation of §3304 would give 
Wimberly better treatment than similar, non-pregnant 
claimants. Petr cites nothing in the legislative history to 
show that Congress contemplated preferential treatment for 
pregnant applicants. In the absence of such an indication, 
the SG makes a milclly __ p.e.:r-S-1:1-a-s-iv.~u~ent that §3304 does 
not override th o. law. ~ 
The best argument 
for is that the 
has 
-. ./" 
decision. Soon after the statute was enacted, the Secretary 
<...___..t 
sent a letter to the states discussing the new "fundamental 
standard." The letter said in part: 
[S3304] requires that the entitlement to benefits 
of pregnant claimants be determined on the same 
basis and under the same provisions applicable to 
all other claimants.... It requires only that a 
pregnant claimant not be treated differently under 
~e law from any other unemployed individual, and 
that the benefits be paid on the basis of 
whether she meets the [state] statute's 
conditions. Resp Brief at 42. 
In a subsequent letter the Secretary added that §3304 
"[does] not speak to treating pregnant claimants more 
favorably" than those who leave their jobs because of 
illness or injury. SG Brief at 27. 
In Brown v. Porcher, supra, the CA4 acknowledged that J.?~f 
the Secretary took a position contrary to ~/9~ 
of S 3304 (i.e., ~1-u.f 
discounted the because 
the letter to any authority or 
legislative history. 660 F.2d, at 1005. It should be 
"' noted, however, that the Secretary did not participate as 
either a party or amicus before the CA4, and thus its 
opportunity to support its position was limited. 
The Secretary thus agrees with the decision below that, 
as long as pregnant claimants receive the same treatment as 
other employees, they are not being disqualified "solely" on 
the basis of pregnancy. In the absence of clear language or 
legislative history to the contrary, I recommend that the 
Court defer to this interpretation. The Secretary is 
responsible for implementing the federal standards that 
regulate state unemployment compensation systems, and thus 
its interpretation is entitled to considerable deference. 
Chevron v. Natural Resources Defense Counc i 1, supra. The 
Secretary's interpretation is a reasonable one, and while .._________, 
not compelled, it is consistent with the evfdence of 
Congressional intent. Wimberly has given no persuasive 
reason for the Court to adopt a contrary position. 
B. Policy Considerations 
Each side argues at length that public policy favors 
~
their respective positions. Because these arguments are 
fairly obvious, I wi 11 not rehash them. Petr naturally 
claims that pregnant women who are ready and willing to work 
will be severely disadvantaged by the decision below. She 
makes an appealing claim that women already face a host of 
job-related diffi~ultie~ when they become pregnant, and that 
many of these claimants desperately need the compensation 
when they are unable to return to their previous position. 
Resp, on the other hand, argues that by giving pregnant 
leave their jobs, the Court would be introducing great 
uncertainty into the state unemployment system. Resp claims --- --------------------~ 
that if Wimberly's position were to prevail, it would change 
the state system from one of strict compensation to a 
program more analogous to welfare, which plainly is not what 
Congress intended. 
III. SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATION 
Although my sympathies are entirely with the 
petitioner, I c annot conclude that her arguments are 
sufficient to overturn the decision below. Because the 
statute and the legislative history are ambiguous, and 
because the Secretary consistently has interpreted the 
statute to allow a distinction such as the one drawn by the 
Missouri, I agree that § 3304 does not preclude Wimberly's 
disqualification. 
I recommend that the decision of the Missouri Supreme 
Court be affirmed. 
December 8, 1986 
WIMBERLY GINA-POW 
85-129 Wimberly v. Labor & Industry (Supreme Court of 
Missouri) 
85-993 Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals Commission (Fla. 
State DC) 
MEMO TO FILE: 
Both of these cases to be argued the last week of the 
December arguments involve denials of unemplyment 
compensation insurance. Wimberly (the Missouri case) 
involves the validity of the Missouri statute that denies 
unemployment compensation except where the unemployment 
resulted from a work-related cause. Petitioner Wimberly 
quite work because of pregnancy, and she was denied 
unemployment compensation beca§ e the Missouri statute -
neutral on its face - applied only where the unemployment 
resulted from a work-related cause. An employee who was 
injured or ill and quit for these reasons also would be 
denied the benefits. 
The second case, Hobbie v. Unemployment Commission 
(Florida) involves a member of the Seventh Day Adventist 
Church. She had worked for a jewelry store for 2 1/2 
years before she joined the Church. Although the jewelry 
store's primariy business times were Friday evening and 
all day Saturday, Hobbi -E. declined to work during these 
periods because for Seven Day Adventist members these were 
days of rest. Under Florida Law a former emloyee is 
disqualified for benefits if discharged for "misconduct". 
The Florida Commission ruled that Hobbie's refusal to work 
was misconduct because she had joined the Church knowing 
that the store's busiest period was from Friday evening 
through Saturday. She therefore put herself in this 
position. 
* * * 
The two cases to be argued this week are different. 
Wimberly relied on a federal statute that said in 
substance that a woman could not be denied workmen's 
compensation benefits "solely because of pregnancy". The 
Florida statute involved only the state law mentioned 
above. Thus the two cases are not necessarily controlled 
by the same decisions or principles. 
With respect to Hobbie, there are two "free exercise" 
decsions of this Court that may well be controlling. The 
first is Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398. In that case 
oJo 
the Court held that South Carolina could not deny 
unemployment benefits to a Seven Day Adventist who refused -· -~ 
to work on Saturday. 
\.._ -.......... The South Carolina law provided that 
to be eligible, a claimant must be "able to work and 
available for work". A claimant was ineligible if he or 
she failed, without good cause to accept available 
suitable work when offered". The court found that denial 
of benefits burdened the claimant's free exercise rights. 
In the more recent case of Thomas v. Review Board, 
450 u.s. 707, an opinion by Chief Justice Burger, we 
reaffirmed Sherbert. In Thomas, a Jehovah Witness quite 
when he was transferred to a job that required work 
directly on tanks for the Army. On the basis of his 
religious beliefs, he quit the job. The State 
Unemployment Commission denied benefits because his 
termination was not based upon "good cause arising in 
connection with his work." This Court held that the 
Indiana Statute as applied burdened Thomas's free exercise 
of religion. The Court's opinion includes broad and 
sweeping language that probably controls Hobbie. 
LFP, JR. 
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To: Justice Powell 
From: Andy 
Re: Wimberly v. Labor and Industrial Relations Commn, No. 85-
129; other state statutes regarding pregnancy and 
unemployment benefits. 
You asked me to find out how other states treat women who 
left their job because they were pregnant. According to the SG, 
not disqualify women who leave work for "good 
states, either by statute or common law, have ----
defined pregnancy as a "good cause" for being unemployed. -----
Therefore, when the women try to return to the workforce, they 
are entitled to benefits if they cannot find a job. See SG Brief 
at 8-9. 
You also asked me to find out how many other states treat 
women the same way that Missouri does. The SG says that "a few" 
do, and gives two examples (Ok, Vt). Amicus Equal Rights 
Advocates lists five states that disqualify claimants who quit 
for reasons not attributable to the employer {Ga, La, NJ, NC, 
Wis). So while nobody seems to know for sure, the answer 
probably is betwet! ~ (counting ~). ~ ~ 1 
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Re: No. 85-129, Wimberly v. Labor & Industry 
Dear Sandra: 
In your next circulation will you please add the 
following at the conclusion of your opinion: 
I 
~ / 
JUSTICE BLACKMUN took no part in the decision 
of this case. 
Sincerely, 
.... ... . . ·~· , . ....... , .-:·· \ .. :.·- . : . . . ·,, .. 
Justice O'Connor 
cc: The Conference 
' .. '·., 
CHAMBERS OF 
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January 7, 
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1st DRAFT 
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
No. 85-129 
LINDA WIMBERLY, PETITIONER v. LABOR AND 
INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS COMMISSION OF 
MISSOURI ET AL. 
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT 
OF MISSOURI 
[January-, 1987] 
JUSTICE O'CONNOR delivered the opinion of the Court. 
The Missouri Supreme Court concluded that the Federal 
Unemployment Tax Act, 26 U. S. C. §3304(a)(12), does not 
prohibit a state from disqualifying unemployment compensa-
tion claimants who leave their jobs because of pregnancy, 
when the state imposes the same disqualification on all claim-
ants who leave their jobs for a reason not causally connected 
to their work or their employer. 688 S. W. 2d 344. We 
granted certiorari because the court's decision conflicts with 
that of the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit in Brown 
v. Porcher, 660 F. 2d 1001 (1981), cert. denied, 459 U. S. 
1150 (1983), on a question of practical significance in the ad-
ministration of state unemployment compensation laws. 
I 
In August 1980, after having been employed by the J. C. 
Penney Company for approximately three years, petitioner 
requested a leave of absence on account of her pregnancy. 
Pursuant to its established policy, theJ. C. Penney Company 
granted petitioner a "leave without guarantee of reinstate-
ment," meaning that petitioner would be rehired only if a po-
sition was available when petitioner was ready to return to 
work. Petitioner's child was born on November 5, 1980. 
On December 1, 1980, when petitioner notified J. C. Penney 
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that she wished to return to work, she was told that there 
were no positions open. 
Petitioner then filed a claim for unemployment benefits. 
The claim was denied by the Division of Employment Secu-
rity (Division) pursuant to Mo. Rev. Stat. § 288. 050.1(1), 
which disqualifies a claimant who "has left his work volun-
tarily without good cause attributable to his work or to his 
employer." A deputy for the Division determined that peti-
tioner had "quit because of pregnancy," App. to Petn. for 
Cert. A53, and therefore had left work "voluntarily and with-
out good cause attributable to [her] work or to [her] em-
ployer." Id., at A52. Petitioner appealed the decision to 
the Division's appeals tribunal, which, after a full evidentiary 
hearing, entered findings of fact and conclusions of law af-
firming the deputy's decision. The Labor and Industrial Re-
lations Commission denied petitioner's petition for review. 
Petitioner then sought review in the Circuit Court of Jack-
son County, Missouri. The court concluded that 
§288.050.1(1) was inconsistent with 26 U.S. C. §3304(a)(12) 
as construed in Brown v. Porcher, supra, and therefore could 
not be enforced. Following Brown, the Circuit Court held 
that § 3304(a)(12) "banned the use of pregnancy or its termi-
nation as an excuse for denying benefits to otherwise eligible 
women," id., at A44, and accordingly reversed the Commis-
sion's decision and remanded for entry of an award. The 
Missouri Court of Appeals affirmed. Although the Court of 
Appeals expressed "reservations concerning the soundness of 
the ruling in Brown," id., at A39, it felt constrained to follow 
the Fourth Circuit's construction of § 3304(a)(12). 
The Missouri Supreme Court reversed, with three judges 
dissenting. The court held that previous state appellate de-
cisiOns had correctly interpreted Mo. Rev. Stat. 
§ 288.050.1(1) as disqualifying all claimants who, like peti-
tioner, leave work "for reasons that, while perhaps legitimate 
and necessary from a personal standpoint, were not causally 
connected to the claimant's work or employer." 688 S. W. 
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2d 344, 346 (1985). Rejecting the notion that it was bound 
by Brown v. Porcher, supra, the court determined that 
§ 288.050.1(1) was consistent with the federal statute. The 
court held that the plain language of§ 3304(a)(12) only prohib-
its state laws from singling out pregnancy for unfavorable 
treatment. The Missouri scheme does not conflict with this 
requirement, the court found, because the state law does not 
expressly refer to pregnancy; rather, benefits are denied only 
when claimants leave work for reasons not attributable to the 
employer or connected with the work. The court noted that 
the Department of Labor, the agency charged with enforcing 
the statute, consistently has viewed § 3304(a)(12) as prohibit-
ing discrimination rather than mandating preferential treat-
ment. We now affirm. 
II 
The Federal Unemployment Tax Act (Act), 26 U. S. C. 
§ 3301 et seq. (1982), enacted originally as Title IX of the So-
cial Security Act in 1935, 49 Stat. 639, envisions a coopera-
tive federal-state program of benefits to unemployed work-
ers. See St. Martin Evangelical Lutheran Church v. South 
Dakota, 451 U. S. 772, 775 (1981). The Act establishes cer-
tain minimum federal standards that a state must satisfy in 
order for a state to participate in the program. See 26 
U. S. C. §3304(a). The standard at issue in this case, 
§ 3304(a)(12), mandates that "no person shall be denied com-
pensation under such State law solely on the basis of preg-
nancy or termination of pregnancy." 
Apart from the minimum standards reflected in § 3304(a), 
the Act leaves to state discretion the rules governing the ad-
ministration of unemployment compensation programs. See 
Steward Machine Co. v. Davis, 301 U. S. 548 (1937). State 
programs, therefore, vary in their treatment of the distribu-
tion of unemployment benefits, although all require a claim-
ant to satisfy some version of a three-part test. First, all 
states require claimants to earn a specified amount of wages 
or to work a specified number of weeks in covered employ-
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ment during a one-year base period in order to be entitled to 
receive benefits. Second, all states require claimants to be 
"eligible" for benefits, that is, they must be able to work and 
available for work. Third, claimants who satisfy these re-
quirements may be "disqualified" for reasons set forth in 
state law. The most common reasons for disqualification 
under state unemployment compensation laws are volun-
tarily leaving the job without good cause, being discharged 
for misconduct, and refusing suitable work. See Brief for 
United States as Amicus Curiae 2-3; Note, Denial of Unem-
ployment Benefits to Otherwise Eligible Women on the Basis 
of Pregnancy: Section 3304(a)(12) of the Federal Unemploy-
ment Tax Act, 82 Mich. L. Rev. 1925, 1928-1929 (1984). 
The treatment of pregnancy-related terminations is a mat-
ter of considerable disparity among the states. Most states 
regard leave on account of pregnancy as a voluntary termina-
tion for good cause. Some of these states have specific stat-
utory provisions enumerating pregnancy-motivated termina-
tion as good cause for leaving a job, while others, by judicial 
or administrative decision, treat pregnancy as encompassed 
within larger categories of good cause such as illness or com-
pelling personal reasons.' A few states, however, like Mis-
souri, have chosen to define "leaving for good cause" nar-
rowly.2 In these states, all persons who leave their jobs are 
disqualified from receiving benefits unless they leave for rea-
sons directly attributable to the work or to the employer. 
Petitioner does not dispute that the Missouri scheme treats 
pregnant women the same as all other persons who leave for 
1 States with statutory provisions that specifically treat pregnancy as 
good cause for leaving work include Arkansas, South Dakota, and Tennes-
see. See Ark. Stat. Ann. § 81-1106(a) (1976 & Supp. 1985); S. D. Codified 
Laws Ann. § 61-6-3 (1978); Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-7-303(a)(1) (Supp. 1985). 
For an example of a state that has reached the same result by adminis-
trative determination, see Cal. Admin. Code tit. 22, R. 1256-15(b), re-
printed in 2 Unempl. Ins. Rep. (CCH) § 52190 (Apr. 8, 1982). 
2 See, e. g., Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 40, §§2-404, 2-405 (West 1986); Vt. 
Stat. Ann. tit. 21, § 1344(a)(3) (1978 & Supp. 1985). 
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reasons not causally connected to their work or their em-
ployer, including those suffering from other types of tempo-
rary disabilities. Tr. of Oral Arg. 8. See Fifer v. Missouri 
Division of Employment Security, 665 S. W. 2d 81 (Mo. Ct. 
App. 1984); Duffy v. Labor and Industrial Relations 
Comm'n, 556 S. W. 2d 195 (Mo. Ct. App. 1977). She con-
tends, however, that § 3304(a)(12) is not simply an antidis-
crimination statute, but rather that it mandates preferential 
treatment for women who leave work because of pregnancy. 
According to petitioner, § 3304(a)(12) affirmatively requires 
states to provide unemployment benefits to women who leave 
work because of pregnancy when they are next available and 
able to work, regardless of the state's treatment of other sim-
ilarly situated claimants. See Brief for Petitioner 19-25. 
Contrary to petitioner's assertions, the plain import of the 
language of § 3304(a)(12) is that Congress intended only to 
prohibit states from singling out pregnancy for unfavorable 
treatment. The text of the statute provides that compensa-
tion shall not be denied under state law "solely on the basis of 
pregnancy." The focus of this language is on the basis for 
the state's decision, not the claimant's reason for leaving her 
job. Thus, a state could not decide to deny benefits to preg-
nant women while at the same time allowing benefits to per-
sons who are in other respects similarly situated: the "sole 
basis" for such a decision would be on account of pregnancy. 
On the other hand, if a state adopts a neutral rule that inci-
dentally disqualifies pregnant or formerly pregnant claimants 
as part of a larger group, the neutral application of that rule 
cannot readily be characterized as a decision made "solely on 
the basis of pregnancy." For example, under Missouri law, 
all persons who leave work for reasons not causally con-
nected to the work or the employer are disqualified from re-
ceiving benefits. To apply this law, it is not necessary to 
know that petitioner left because of pregnancy: all that is 
relevant is that she stopped work for a reason bearing no 
causal connection to her work or her employer. Because the 
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state's decision could have been made without ever knowing 
that petitioner had been pregnant, pregnancy was not the 
"sole basis" for the decision under a natural reading of 
§ 3304(a)(12)'s language. 
We have, on other occasions, construed language similar to 
that in § 3304(a)(12) as prohibiting disadvantageous treat-
ment, rather than as mandating preferential treatment. In 
Monroe v. Standard Oil Co., 452 U. S. 549 (1981), for exam-
ple, the Court considered 38 U. S. C. § 2021(b)(3), a provision 
of the Vietnam Era Veterans' Readjustment Assistance Act 
of 1974, which provides that a person "shall not be denied re-
tention in employment . . . because of any obligation" as a 
member of the Nation's Reserve Forces. The Monroe Court 
concluded that the intent of the provision was to afford re-
servists "the same treatment afforded their co-workers with-
out military obligations," 452 U. S., at 560; it did not create 
an "employer responsibility to provide preferential treat-
ment." Id., at 562. Similarly, in Southeastern Community 
College v. Davis, 442 U. S. 397 (1979), we considered§ 504 of 
the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U. S. C. § 794, which pro-
vides that an "otherwise qualified handicapped individual" 
shall not be excluded from a federally funded program "solely 
by reason of his handicap." We concluded that the statutory 
language was only intended to "eliminate discrimination 
against otherwise qualified individuals," and generally did 
not mandate "affirmative efforts to overcome the disabilities 
caused by handicaps." 442 U. S., at 410. 
Even petitioner concedes that § 3304(a)(12) does not pro-
hibit states from denying benefits to pregnant or formerly 
pregnant women who fail to satisfy neutral eligibility require-
ments such as ability to work and availability for work. See 
Brief for Petitioner 24. See also S. Rep. 94-1265, 94th 
Cong., 2d Sess., p. 21 (1976) ("[p]regnant individuals would 
continue to be required to meet generally applicable criteria 
of availability for work and ability to work"); H. R. Rep. 
94-755, ~4th Cong., 1st Sess., p. 50 (1975). Nevertheless, 
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she contends that the statute prohibits the application to 
pregnant women of neutral disqualification provisions. 
Reply Brief for Petitioner 8-9. But the statute's plain lan-
guage will not support the distinction petitioner attempts to 
draw. The statute does not extend only to disqualification 
rules. It applies, by its own terms, to any decision to deny 
compensation. In both instances, the scope of the statutory 
mandate is the same: the state cannot single out pregnancy 
for disadvantageous treatment, but it is not compelled to af-
ford preferential treatment. 
The legislative history cited by petitioner does not support 
her view that § 3304(a)(12) mandates preferential treatment 
for women on account of pregnancy. Petitioner contends 
that § 3304(a)(12) as originally drafted was only an antidis-
crimination statute, but that the statute in its final form 
reaches more broadly. The original version of§ 3304(a)(12) 
provided: 
"No person shall be denied compensation solely on the 
basis of pregnancy and determinations under any provi-
sion of such State law relating to voluntary termination 
of employment, availability for work, active search for 
work, or refusal to accept work shall not be made in a 
manner which discriminates on the basis of pregnancy." 
S. 2079, 94th Cong., 1st Sess., § 8(a) (1975); H. R. 8366, 
94th Cong., 1st Sess., § 8(a) (1975) (emphasis added). 
According to petitioner, the deletion of the emphasized lan-
guage, particularly the reference to "discrimination," 
manifests congressional intent to transform the scope of the 
statute. But petitioner can point to nothing in the legisla-
tive history that would support the view that Congress in-
tended such a dramatic change. It is difficult to see how the 
deletion of language after the conjunctive "and" could expand 
the scope of the statute, when what was to become the final 
version of§ 3304(a)(12) already was present, essentially in its 
entirety, in the first clause of the original bill. Indeed, how-
ever the first phrase is interpreted-either to ban discrimina-
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tion or to mandate preference-the additional antidiscrimina-
tion language would have been superfluous. We conclude 
that Congress intended simply to eliminate a lengthy and re-
dundant phrase, without intending to change the meaning of 
the provision. This explains Congress' silence on the ques-
tion, without violating either logic or language. 
Petitioner's reliance upon other portions of the legislative 
history also is unavailing. As petitioner notes, the House 
Report on the bill containing the language now found in 
§ 3304(a)(12) refers to "nineteen states" that had "special dis-
qualification provisions pertaining to pregnancy." H. R. 
Rep. 94-755, at 7. The report goes on to observe that 
"[s]everal of these provisions hold pregnant women unable to 
work and unavailable to work; the remainder disqualify a 
claimant because she left work on account of her condition or 
because her unemployment is a result of pregnancy." I d. 
Although the report does not specify which 19 states had 
"special disqualification provisions pertaining to pregnancy," 
the parties agree that Congress most probably was referring 
to the 19 states listed in a program letter issued by the De-
partment of Labor a week before the committee report was 
filed. See Unemployment Insurance Program Letter 
No. 33-75 (Dec. 8, 1975). In that letter, the agency called 
for the repeal of state laws which "still include special dis-
qualifications for pregnancy or automatically consider un-
available for work any pregnant claimant." ld. , at 2. In an 
attached summary, the letter discussed the statutory provi-
sions of 19 states relating to pregnancy. 
Neither Missouri nor any state with a rule like Missouri's is 
included in the list of 19 states having special disqualification 
provisions pertaining to pregnancy. The summary includes 
only state provisions that disqualify women from receiving 
unemployment compensation for a defined period around the 
date of childbirth (the kind of provision at issue in Turner v. 
Department of Employment Security, 423 U. S. 44 (1975)); 
provisions that specifically disqualify women who leave work 
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because of pregnancy; and miscellaneous provisions that oth-
erwise single out pregnancy for disadvantageous treatment. 
Petitioner argues that the Department omitted states with 
neutral disqualification provisions because "their policies 
were not apparent from their statutes." Brief for Petitioner 
24. But Missouri does not have a "policy" specifically relat-
ing to pregnancy: it neutrally disqualifies workers who leave 
their jobs for reasons unrelated to their employment. The 
focus of the House Report clearly was on "discriminatory 
disqualification because of pregnancy," H. R. Rep. 
No. 94-755, at 50 (emphasis added); there is no hint in the 
House Report of any disagreement with state provisions that 
neutrally disqualify workers who leave their jobs for reasons 
unrelated to their employment. 
The Senate Report also focuses exclusively on state rules 
that single out pregnant women for disadvantageous treat-
ment. In Turner v. Department of Employment Security, 
supra, this Court struck down on due process grounds a Utah 
statute providing that a woman was disqualified for 12 weeks 
before the expected date of childbirth and for 6 weeks after 
childbirth, even if she left work for reasons unrelated to 
pregnancy. The Senate Report used the provision at issue 
in Turner as representative of the kind of rul¥'that 
§ 3304(a)(12) was intended to prohibit: 
"In a number of States, an individual whose unemploy-
ment is related to pregnancy is barred from receiving 
any unemployment benefits. In 1975 the Supreme 
Court found a provision of this type in the Utah unem-
ployment compensation statute to be unconstitutional 
A number of other States have similar provisions 
although most appear to involve somewhat shorter peri-
ods of disqualification." S. Rep. No. 94-1265, at 19, 21 
(emphasis added). 
In short, petitioner can point to nothing in the committee 
reports, or elsewhere in the statute's legislative history, that 
evidences congressional intent to mandate preferential treat-
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ment for women on account of pregnancy. There is no hint 
that Congress disapproved of, much less intended to prohibit, 
a neutral rule such as Missouri's. Indeed, the legislative his-
tory shows that Congress was focused only on the issue ad-
dressed by the plain language of § 3304(a)(12): prohibiting 
rules that single out pregnant women or formerly pregnant 
women for disadvantageous treatment. 
Finally, the Department of Labor's interpretation of 
§ 3304(a)(12) supports the holding of the Missouri Supreme 
Court. Shortly after the enactment of § 3304(a)(12), the 
agency distributed instructions to the states regarding the 
implementation of its terms. Petitioner emphasizes that the 
instructions state, in part: "A number of State laws deny 
benefits for causes related to pregnancy. These provisions 
are inequitable in that benefits are denied regardless of 
whether or not the individual is able and available for work 
and otherwise eligible." United States Department of 
Labor, Employment and Training Administration, Unem-
ployment Insurance Service, "Draft Language and Commen-
tary to Implement the Unemployment Compensation 
Amendments of 1976-P. L. 94-556, at 62 (undated 1976). 
If there is any ambiguity in these sentences, the balance of 
the communication clearly establishes that the agency viewed 
§ 3304(a)(12) as an antidiscrimination provision: 
"The new provision requires that the entitlement to 
benefits of pregnant claimants be determined on the 
same basis and under the same provisions applicable to 
all other claimants. It does not mean that pregnant 
claimants are entitled to benefits without meeting the re-
quirements of the law for the receipt of benefits. It re-
quires only that a pregnant claimant not be treated 
differently under the law from any other unemployed in-
dividual and that benefits be paid or denied not on the 
basis of pregnancy but on the basis of whether she meets 
the statute's conditions for receipt of benefits." !d. 
• 
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The agency reiterated this view in a later communication 
to the states, stating that § 3304(a)(12) "does not speak to 
treating pregnant claimants more favorably. It only re-
quires that they not be disqualified solely on the basis of 
pregnancy or its termination." United States Department 
of Labor, Employment and Training Administration, Unem-
ployment Insurance Service, "Supplement No. !-Questions 
and Answers Supplementing 'Draft Language and Commen-
tary to Implement the Unemployment Compensation 
Amendments of 1976---P. L. 94-566, '" at 26 (Dec. 7, 1976). 
Since then the agency has adhered to the same view. See 
Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 27-28. Thus, the 
agency's interpretation of the statute, like its legislative his-
tory, confirms what is clear from the statute's plain language: 
that § 3304(a)(12) prohibits discrimination but does not man-
date preferential treatment. 
Because § 3304(a)(12) does not require states to afford pref-
erential treatment to women on account of pregnancy, the 
judgment of the Missouri Supreme Court is affirmed. 
It is so ordered . 
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